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Abstract: 
We argue that consistent decision making in judging a patent’s validity and basing 
this on its underlying technological quality are important elements of patent office 
service (“assessment”) quality. To understand which level of assessment quality 
patent offices (can) provide, particularly in new technological areas, we study the 
concordance of the European Patent Office's (EPO) granting and opposition 
decisions for individual patents. Using the biotechnology industry in the 1980s (an 
emerging patenting area then) as an example, we find no empirical evidence that 
the EPO provided maximal or optimal assessment quality as far as can be told from 
bibliographic indicators. We discuss research limitations and consequences of this 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
This paper is motivated by the ongoing discussion in the popular media, among policy makers 
and in academic circles (e.g., Samuelson, 2004) about “decreasing patent quality” as a consequence of 
decreasing patent office “service quality”. “Patent quality” can be defined along two major 
dimensions; namely (a) the techno-(economic) quality created by a patent’s underlying invention; and 
(b) the legal quality created by a patent’s reliability as an enforceable property right (Thomas, 2002). 
This second (legal) dimension of quality pertains to a patent’s sustainability when challenged. In this 
regard, a patent office’s role in providing consistent service is twofold. First, it must consistently 
assess patent applications and only grant patents with sufficient technological quality 
(novelty/inventive step) (Reitzig, 2005). Second, it must assess those patents that have been 
challenged using criteria that are consistent with initial assessments. The quality of patent office 
assessments, however, has been heavily debated. Critics claim that assessment quality is decreasing. 
Many of these claims are based on the observation that patent offices are (allegedly) incapable of 
examining patent quality in areas where no prior art patents exist. This concern is most applicable in 
emerging technological areas, such as software or nanotechnology (Merges, 1999). However, related 
empirical evidence is mixed (Allison & Tiller, 2003; Merges, 1999; Quillen & Webster, 2001). The 
impact that patent validity assessments has on national innovative activity and the heated debate at 
present suggests that there exists the need for robust empirical evidence shedding light on the question 
of how good patent granting procedures are. At present, it is unclear how reliable it is that a patent, 
once granted, will survive challenges (i.e., validity suits), and if not, the reasons why such 
inconsistency occurs. 
Our research focuses on one core component of “assessment quality”, validity examination 
quality, and whether patent offices (can) provide it in novel technological areas. We empirically assess 
whether the European Patent Office (EPO) consistently based its judgments on technological quality 
when repeatedly deciding on the validity of identical individual patents during granting and challenge 
phases. In addition, we critically discuss how such consistency can be undesirable in ensuring 
assessment quality. We focus our empirical analysis to study the existence of systematic 
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(in)consistencies between these granting decisions and challenge decisions relating to individual 
patents. 
We focus on the EPO for various reasons. First, the EPO is relevant in being one of the biggest 
patent offices worldwide, administering the protection of inventions for the largest internal global 
market. Second – and an important reason from our research perspective – EPO patent application data 
allows one to observe granting, “challenge” (i.e. opposition), and opposition outcomes. For the 
purpose of this paper, we assume European “oppositions” are similar to U.S. “central validity suits” 
(see Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004 for a detailed comparison), such that any EPO ruling on an opposition 
will affect all designated national member states where applicants sought patent protection. To test our 
model, we require observations of opposition rulings made by patent offices; subsequently, we focus 
on biotechnology patents initially filed between 1978 and 1987. At this time, biotechnology was an 
emerging technology from the perspective of the EPO (Orsigeno, 1989). In this regard, decisions by 
patent offices about biotech patents are comparable to decisions currently relating to software and 
nanotechnology, but for which challenge decision data are not yet available (Merges, 1999).  
Our econometric analysis and theoretical approach to questions of assessment consistency 
provides some notable departures. We model information on the technological quality of patents 
available to the EPO by using information in the form of standard bibliographic indicators (e.g., 
backward references; family size; forward cites). We estimate a series of discrete choice models using 
these bibliographic indicators to explain patent grant and opposition outcomes. The parameter 
estimates provide insight (termed “paramorphic representation” by Hoffman, 1960) into how patent 
offices make assessments; namely the estimates quantify those dimensions of quality that are given 
more emphasis in patent office decisions. If patent offices act consistently, we expect similar 
parameter estimates for granting and opposition decisions. A major econometric and theoretical 
obstacle, however, is that these two sets of estimates are confounded with decision variability, as well 
as other sources of random error. Our econometric approach is based upon and extends a set of 
discrete choice models already used in other fields, such as marketing and transportation (see 
Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000; Louviere, 2001). We apply these models here because they can 
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account for issues of variability – including its confounding effects on parameter estimates – ensuring 
valid comparisons and conclusions.  
We summarize our major empirical findings as follows: within the general limitations of our 
indicator-based research design, particularly our framework of assumptions and for our chosen data, 
we cannot confirm that the EPO assessed the technological quality of biotech patents consistently in 
the early 1980s. Specifically, we do not find convincing evidence of congruent systematic effects 
driving the assessment of a patent’s technological quality during granting or opposition stages. We 
consider that examiners (who decide initially whether to grant a patent) and members of opposition 
divisions (who decide on cases when a granted patent is opposed) may have different information. We 
use preliminary bibliographic indicators to capture informational change between grant and opposition 
stages. After including these indicators in our models, we find that examiners and opposition divisions 
do not primarily disagree because one holds more “costly-to-generate” information than the other. 
Rather, it seems that patent offices assess patent-quality related information differently at these two 
stages; hence, it less likely that inconsistency is driven by an effort of patent offices to allocate 
resources optimally between grant and opposition. Time effects, which do not relate to a patents’ 
technological quality, seem to explain most of the decision-making of patent offices across stages. 
These findings indicate that changing environmental conditions in which examiners operate, as well as 
their own learning over time, account for most of the decision making pattern. 
In Section 2 we provide clearer definitions of the term “patent quality”, conceptually link it to 
the central notion of “assessment quality”, and discuss prior research. In Section 3 we develop our 
testable hypotheses and introduce our methodology. In Section 4 we describe the data and present 
estimation results. In Section 5 we discuss these and highlight several research limitations. Section 6 
concludes and presents new questions for research into patent quality. 
 
- 4 - 
 
2 BACKGROUND – THEORY AND RELATED PRIOR EMPIRICS 
2.1 Theory 
2.1.1 Dimensions of “patent quality” – techno-economic and legal considerations 
 The economic arguments for patent protection relate to stimulating research and development 
(R&D); encouraging disclosure of technological knowledge; and, facilitating technology transfer (see 
Gallini, 2001). Underlying these arguments are two fundamental assumptions: (1) technology 
contributes to social welfare; and (2) the economic value of a patent is in its underlying technological 
sophistication (for critiques on these assumptions see Merges, 1988, and Reitzig, 2005). Prior 
literature suggests that patent offices should adjust their minimal conditions for patentability 
requirements to guarantee that inventions have a sufficient level of technological quality (Nordhaus, 
1967; Scotchmer & Green, 1990; Green & Scotchmer, 1995; Barton, 2001). This is because many 
economists traditionally assume that technological quality correlates highly with a patent’s economic 
value; therefore it is also termed technological ‘merit’ (see Merges, 1988). This is also why we use the 
terms “techno-economic” and “technological quality” interchangeably in the following. Economists 
believe that a patent must exceed an absolute threshold of technological quality for it to be granted. 
Lawyers, on the other hand, traditionally concentrate on another dimension of a patent’s 
quality: namely, its legal sustainability. According to Thomas (2002) 
“‘quality patents’ are [...] valid patents [which may] be reliably enforced in court, 
consistently expected to surmount validity challenges, and dependably employed as 
a technology transfer tool” (Thomas, 2002: 730)  
This definition focuses exclusively on legal certainty or consistency. For Thomas, as for other lawyers, 
the optimal absolute adjustment of patentability parameters (disclosure, novelty, and inventive step), 
and identifying a technological threshold appear second-order compared with ensuring requirements 
of legal certainty; hence, lawyers focus on the relative comparability of patent assessments from one 
case to another. In general, Merges (1999) appears to share Thomas’ (2002) standpoint, however, he 
admits that resource constraints during the granting procedure prohibit calling every patent a bad 
patent that does not surmount a validity challenge after being granted:  
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“A ‘bad patent’ is a patent that should have been weeded out after a reasonable 
investment of effort, but was not” (Merges, 1999: 581) 
2.1.2 The link between patent quality and patent assessment quality 
Arguably, assessing patent validity at various stages of a patent (application)’s ‘life’ is the most 
important service that patent offices provide. Incorporating work by Parasuraman et al. (1991), two 
major constructs constitute the quality of a patent office’s services; namely the ability of patent offices 
to act in a consumer orientated fashion and to do so in a reliable manner. In the context of patent 
offices, there are various customers; namely, these are the applicants, as well as society as a whole. 
These stakeholders expect patent offices to judge patentability requirements correctly against a given 
yardstick (i.e., economic dimension of quality), and reliably (or consistently) in the sense that the 
service can be trusted (i.e., legal dimension of quality). For the purpose of this paper, and, in keeping 
with prior literature, we therefore define patent assessment quality as:  
“a patent office’s consistent categorization of patents along a dimension of technological 
quality leading to sustainable property rights”. 
 
2.1.3 Maximal and optimal levels of patent assessment quality 
In an ideal world where patent offices can objectively assess patent quality and maximize it, we 
would expect to observe no inconsistencies in patent validity assessments. That is, once a patent is 
granted, we would not expect it to be amended or revoked/annulled. Service quality, however, comes 
at a cost, and as such is not a self-purpose but will have a theoretical optimum. In particular, patent 
assessments are the product of a (subjective) human activity, prone to errors arising from our cognitive 
and emotional imperfections. Completely eliminating these errors comes at a prohibitive cost. Thus, 
various errors occur that force us to rethink the desirability of “consistent” assessments5. We now 
discuss three errors in respect to the initial granting procedure (see Box 1).  
Insert Box 1 about here 
                                                          
5  The source of such imperfections (e.g., demand to meet quotas) or how they can be minimised in 
general (e.g., training) is not the purpose of the paper and we do not discuss these in any detail. An assumption is 
made that patents are assessed in an equitable fashion, given the environment encountered by assessors. 
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First, patent offices may make minor errors in their initial subjective judgment of the objective 
technological quality of patents (Stage 1), although this may be inconsequential to decision outcomes 
(we label these error “type α”). That is, even allowing for some human error between objective and 
subjective assessments of quality, examiners may still correctly classify a good patent as good and a 
bad patent as bad. Second, patent offices may incorrectly reject patents fulfilling patentability 
requirements (we label these error “type β”). Third, patent offices may incorrectly grant a patent, even 
though it has an objectively poor level of quality (we label this error “type γ”).6 The latter two errors 
are most consequential for patent applicants.  
Patent offices can rectify initial patent granting errors, however, provided that they have 
mechanisms in place for correcting these. At the EPO, the “appeal to grant” procedure corrects for 
“type β” errors, and the “opposition procedure” corrects for “type γ” errors. Patent offices must 
optimally balance the various errors that occur. This is difficult if one considers that some errors in 
patent assessment may be desirable if offices are willing to rely on re-assessment procedures to rectify 
their mistakes in their quest to maximize ex-post efficiency.  
 For example, being more stringent in Stage 1 (granting) assessments (indicated by ‘Threshold 
A’ in Box 1) and granting fewer patents initially, places greater demands on patent office resources in 
managing the procedures of “appeal to grant”. Demands may also fall on inventors themselves, as it 
delays patentable inventions and requires allocating resources to rectify mistakes through the appeals 
to grant procedures. This could increase uncertainty and delay investment in emerging industries. 
Indeed, some patents may never see the light of day as a result of stringent granting policies. On the 
other hand, the use of less stringent thresholds in Stage 1 assessments (indicated by ‘Threshold B’ in 
Box 1) implies a greater level of γ errors. In practice, a greater number of poor patents may saturate 
the market and stakeholders may lose faith in the granting procedures of patent offices.  
Similar types of errors exist at Stage 3, where previously granted patents are reassessed upon 
challenge. The major difference, however, is that there may exist opportunities to minimize such 
errors, given the privilege of hindsight and that reviewers have extra search resources for prior art. 
                                                          
6  We do not enter the philosophical discussion whether “objective” technological quality exists, but 
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That is, in Stage 3, there will still be some level of misclassification of patents in terms of patent 
quality, but we anticipate that the level of such errors will be lower relative to Stage 1; hence, 
assessments in Stage 3 should be closer to the “true” objective assessment of technological quality 
relative to initial assessments in Stage 1. Indeed, this paper is motivated by accounting for these 
anticipated error differences across stages of assessment. Once accounted for, as is achieved in our 
subsequent models presented, questions of systematic consistency can then be properly examined. 
These “desirable errors” should largely be exceptions to the (empirical) rule; otherwise, there is 
a danger these errors could become standard, resulting in a completely arbitrary granting process for 
patents. This can hardly be optimal. On average, therefore, validity decisions should be systematically 
consistent. That is, while we make little comment on how patent offices can reduce errors, we 
conjecture that it is desirable to improve the human imperfections through various strategies such as 
additional examiner training or an appropriate number of examiners to meet demand. 
2.2 Prior empirical research into patent assessment quality 
To the best of our knowledge, few large-scale empirical studies shed light on the question of 
what level of assessment quality patent offices (can) provide, particularly under the aggravating 
circumstances prevalent in novel technological areas. Patent offices face a series of reproaches 
suggesting that low ‘patent quality’ is becoming a problem. We classify these into two major 
categories. Namely, these categories capture (a) commentaries or case-based annotations, stating that 
inventive step (US: non-obviousness) requirements fell systematically over time, and granted patents 
are falling below an acceptable threshold (Samuelson, 2004); as well as (b) comments and anecdotal 
observations about the (increasing) assessment inconsistency by patent offices with respect to the 
technological quality of comparably sophisticated inventions submitted at the same time (Merges, 
1999: p. 589). We summarise the few large-scale empirical findings speaking to these allegations in 
the following sub section.  
2.2.1 Decreasing technological quality requirements over time 
Sampat et al. (2003) track changes in patents’ technological quality using forward citation 
measures. For their chosen sample of university patents, the authors observe a significant decline in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rather, in line with the whole idea of a patent system, take this assumption for granted.  
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forward citations since 1980. It is unclear, however, whether one can generalise these results to non-
university patents. Moreover, it is unclear whether this decline in technological quality was because 
patentability standards for non-obviousness steps were actually falling. 
Sanyal & Jaffe (2005) examine several effects that may account for observable increases in 
patenting rates. In particular, they attempt to disentangle the effects relating to potential decreasing 
patentability standards. Within their framework of assumptions, they attribute increases in filing rates 
to increases in overall inventiveness, whereas evidence for decreases in patenting standards is mixed.  
2.2.2 Inconsistent assessments of technological quality for similar patents 
Quillen & Webster (2001) examine the USPTO (United States Patent Office) granting rates. 
The authors indicate that split applications (continuations) have a higher chance of being granted than 
original applications – all else being equal – because of internal procedures. Indirectly, their results 
support the hypothesis that patent quality was judged along different dimensions in similar cases. For a 
selection of patents with identical priorities (i.e., a patent stems from the same original invention), or 
‘twins’, Graham et al. (2002) track the fate of European oppositions and compare them to US re-
examinations. Their findings indicate that the European and US offices rule distinctly differently in 
similar cases. Although we recognize the attractiveness of their approach, their focus on inter-
institutional consistency contrasts with our focus on intra-institutional patent assessment consistency.  
Allison & Tiller (2003) compare U.S. business method patents with those from ‘established’ 
patenting areas along a series of bibliographic indicators. Within their framework of assumptions, and, 
depending on each indicator’s ability to capture effects relating to patent quality, the authors find no 
significant differences between business method patents and other patents. Despite the study’s 
contribution and although it uses a rich underlying data base, the rather descriptive character of its 
results may render it difficult to draw final conclusions. In essence, the authors compare patents using 
several bibliographic indicators without forcing these indicators to capture quality related 
phenomena.7 
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3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 A Research Gap of Public Sector Relevance 
As the previous section highlighted, large-scale empirical data on patent offices’ consistency 
of discriminating between patentable and non-patentable technology along a yardstick of 
technological quality is missing. From scientific and applied perspectives, this research gap calls for 
an answer. The public sector relevance of this research gap appears tremendous. Reactions of patent 
offices to allegations that their service quality is sub-standard reflect this.8 
Although a fully-fledged analysis of EPO service quality would examine α , β , and γ  errors, 
we focus on analyzing γ  (and somewhat less on α ) errors; that is, we seek to understand patent 
office “service quality” by analyzing if and why patents were “falsely” granted.9 We do this in two 
ways. First, we require an understanding of the degree of systematic (in)consistency for the reasons 
mentioned before (see 2.1.3). We wish to determine if systematic inconsistency are exceptions, since 
neither a maximal nor optimal degree of assessment quality can exist if judgment inconsistencies are 
the norm. Second, we focus on understanding the residual inconsistency: we consider reasons why 
patent assessments are (in)consistent and what this reveals about patent offices’ resource allocations to 
patent assessment  
To examine these two questions, and assessing the EPO’s assessment quality when it is 
exposed to the challenge of judging new technologies (Merges, 1999), we first map the technological 
quality of a patent econometrically. We then compare these assessments during the granting phase and 
the subsequent challenge phase for a given set of patents. To turn these research aims into testable 
hypotheses, the following section introduces the decision making logic of the EPO. We also introduce 
our set of explanatory variables (bibliographic indicators), which we use in our later analyses. Section 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7  As is well known to researchers in the field, bibliographic indicators are noisy measures of a patent’s 
technological quality, and only a part of their variance captures quality-related phenomena. 
8  See for example U.S. Department of Commerce published public report PTD-9977-7-0001 entitled 
“Patent Quality Controls are Inadequate”, attesting an increase in the USPTO’s official error rate of more than 
1000% from 1992 until 1996, as measured by assessment inconsistencies for a random set of cases. Initiatives to 
ensure “patent quality” by introducing quality control mechanisms (so called “second-pair-of-eyes” checks) 
demonstrate the concerns and uncertainties on the side of the offices regarding their current service quality level 
(SUEPO, 2002). Nota bene that patent office definitions of service quality are only concerned with the 
consistency/reliability of their service and less so with the absolute correctness of their judgment. 
9  We elaborate on the shortcomings of this approach in our discussion. 
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3.2 presents the fundamental logic of our estimations and Section 3.3 describes the independent 
variables. In Section 3.4, we present our testable hypotheses. Section 3.5 finally elaborates on the 
econometric specificities of the non-standard estimators chosen for the analysis. 
3.2 Modeling the Decision Making Process of the EPO  
EPO patent data is suitable for the study of the aforementioned research gap for various 
reasons. The paramount argument is that it allows us to simultaneously observe two procedural stages 
relevant for our analysis; namely, the granting procedure and the opposition procedure (including the 
ruling on the opposition). Essentially, as we elaborate upon below, mapping the EPO’s decision on 
granting and opposition outcomes econometrically allows testing of whether an EPO patent – once 
granted – will survive any opposition. In turn, this will provide a good indication of whether EPO 
decisions reflect a normative understanding of ‘quality’ patents (Thomas, 2002).  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 reflects the stages of a European patent application. Upon application and 
examination request, the EPO makes decisions about the patentability of an application. Examiners 
assess applications in terms of several patentability requirements including novelty, inventive step 
(pendant in the US: non-obviousness), disclosure, and susceptibility to industrial commercialization. 
An application is granted patent status if it fulfills these requirements (Stage 1).10 A granted patent can 
be challenged (i.e., attacked centrally for all designated states) within nine months, through an 
opposition procedure (Stage 2). For our purposes, it seems sufficiently correct to state that oppositions 
resemble (first instance) validity suits of a patent at the European level. Oppositions must relate to a 
patent’s inability to meet the aforementioned requirements. The EPO decides on the opposition and 
one of three outcomes occurs: a patent is revoked, amended, or the opposition is rejected (Stage 3). 
If patent offices acted in fully consistent ways (i.e. maximizing assessment quality regardless 
of its desirability) and the information on which granting decisions are based did not change from the 
date of grant until the date of opposition, the rejection rate of oppositions should be close to 100% 
(with a residual error arising from the “human factor”). This is because the general criteria for granting 
a patent initially and upholding a patent during opposition are virtually identical. Across all industries, 
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however, the rejection-of-opposition rate is far from 100%. We propose three explanations: either (A) 
a patent office acts inconsistently (according to our aforementioned definition) because it does not 
correctly assess information available at the time of granting about an invention’s technological 
quality; (B) available information about a patent’s underlying technology between the day of grant and 
the day of the opposition is different; or (C) both. 
Each explanation assumes the existence of γ errors (i.e. falsely granted patents), although the γ 
error may or may not be systematic. Systematic γ errors (explanations B and C) shed a different light 
on the quality of a patent office’s services than unsystematic γ errors (explanation A): e.g. the new 
information, originally provided during the opposition phase, may alter the assessment between patent 
grant and patent opposition. This may indicate that resource constraints, associated with generating 
prior art during the initial examination, drive the result. Alternatively, patent offices may assess 
identical information differently from granting to opposition phases: this is a larger subjective error 
than an error attributable to human factors11. In turn, assessments may appear erratic in this case. 
3.3  Measuring (In)Consistency With Indicators of Technological Quality 
To measure patent assessment quality – and decide for one of the potential explanations A 
through C – we can relate granting and opposition outcome decisions by the EPO to information 
relating to a patent’s quality. This information, available to examiners and members of the opposition 
division, refers to a patent’s novelty, inventive step (non-obviousness), disclosure, and susceptibility to 
industrial commercialization. In practice, patent offices examine information that is idiosyncratic and 
very complex (as complex as application and prior art documents, sometimes more than 100 pages of 
full text). For researchers, however, it is often not feasible to engage in activities of reviewing this 
information when examining a large sample of patents as we do. Instead, in large-scale patent 
econometric studies, typically researchers use a set of standard bibliographic indicators to capture 
phenomena relating to patent quality. Consequentially, in our study, we model a patent’s (latent) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10  Applicants may appeal against the denial of a patent grant, however, this is not the focal theme of this 
Paper (as mentioned before). See also Section 5.1. 
11  In our discussion we elaborate on the possibility that this human error is a matter of fact, in reality also 
reflects the resource constraints examiners face – namely a time constraint when evaluating the information. In 
that case, the human error would have systematic character, too. 
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objective technological quality with a set of bibliographic indicators, which have been used in prior 
studies. Table 1 provides an overview of our explanatory variables. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Several of our proxies were originally validated as indicators of a patent’s economic/financial 
value (see Reitzig, 2004 for a survey), which is admittedly not quite the same as being indicators of a 
patent’s objective technological quality, despite the two being structurally related (see Reitzig, 2005). 
We list the rationales that link these proxy variables to objective technological quality in column 4 of 
Table 1. Although our indicators are blurred measures of a patent’s technological quality, these should 
still capture a good part of its variance. In particular, works by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000) 
and Reitzig (2005) support this allegation. In their work, the authors validate a large part of the 
aforementioned indicators as correlates of patent granting as well as opposition outcome decisions. We 
will bear the weaknesses of our approach in mind when qualifying our results. We discuss our 
indicators’ limited ability to capture informational changes about patent validity over time. Finally, we 
also consider issues relating to an omitted variable bias (see 3.4 for more details).  
3.4 Testable Hypotheses 
Using the decision making logic of the EPO to shed light on our principal research questions, 
we formulate three complementary testable hypotheses to study within a framework of assumptions.12 
In testing our hypotheses relating to patent assessment consistency (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we assume 
that the EPO issues patents that are of a high quality along all dimensions and it does so – as best it 
can – in a constant regulatory environment (Assumption 1). We are not stating that such behavior is 
optimal: the assumption merely serves to set up our empirical test. We base our testing on the premise 
that we can proxy parts of a patent’s technological merit by using bibliographic indicators (see above). 
We will test this premise separately for our sample (H1) and critically review this in our discussion 
section. In addition, we emphasize that we test relational and not causal hypotheses. Although we test 
whether our indicators are valid correlates of the information available to patent offices, we do not test 
whether the indicators are ever causal for the office’s decisions.13 We are aware that examiners and 
                                                          
12  We relax some of these assumptions in Section 4.4 to shed more light on our theory-driven findings.  
13  We thank one of our referees for pointing us to the so-called “cookie-cutter” approach – a term coined 
in connection with US patent examinations. This term describes a situation in which examiners do base their 
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opposition divisions draw from different informational sources; however, we assume that our proxies 
are valid. 
H1 speaks to our indicators’ ability to capture technological quality. In line with earlier works 
(Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000) we propose for our sample:  
H1: For our given sample, the EPO’s assessments of a patent’s technological quality during 
validity decisions can be modeled by patent indicators, including backward references; family 
size; the PCT indicator; the number of applicants and inventors; and, the forward citations 
received until the date of grant. 
Essentially, if H1 cannot be rejected, we are confident that our indicators are proper measures of 
patent validity. 
H2 then is the first comparative interpretation of the observable outcomes for patent grant and 
opposition outcome. To test H2 we use the observation that patent examiners (deciding whether to 
granting patents) and opposition divisions (deciding about opposition cases) share partly identical 
information. This time-invariant information is reflected in the time-invariant patent indicators 
(backward references; family size; PCT indicators; number of applicants and inventors) as well as 
those forward citations received until the date of grant.14 If the EPO was able to accurately assess 
technological quality from the outset, this information would correlate similarly with their rulings in 
Stages 1 (granting) and Stage 3 (opposition outcome). Consequently, we propose: 
H2: When the EPO’s assessment decisions on a patent’s technological quality are modeled by 
patent indicators (including, backward references; family size; PCT indicators; number of applicants 
and inventors; forward citations received until the date of grant) then there is no significant difference 
in the role of these predictors in granting and opposition outcome decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
decision directly on first-sight information of the type we use in our statistical analysis to model validity-related 
information. If this approach had been adopted during the grant of patens described in our sample as well, then 
the indicators we employ might in fact even be causal for the decision-making we observe. We do, however, 
have no information that EPO examiners ever adopted this cookie-cutter approach and hence assume that the 
indicators are mere correlates of the examiners’ decisions. 
14  Note: as we explain in more detail in Section 4, we draw from the official European Patent Register 
EPOLINE in its version of December 2003. Based on all our inquiries – including talks with fellow researchers 
using EPO data as well as data experts at the EPO, the indicators we consider time-invariant should not change 
post-grant in the electronic registers. 
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Essentially, if H2 is rejected, patent assessment quality would, to an extent that it is measurable 
with bibliographic indicators (see before), be erratic in terms of reliability. However, even if the 
individual variables in H2 show similar roles in predicting granting and opposition outcomes, overall 
inconsistency may exist in the model and this result could be driven by unobservable heterogeneity. In 
other words, there would be a γ  error (i.e., classifying an invention as patentable when objectively it 
fails to meet a quality threshold) in patent office’s assessment, but we do not know what exactly drives 
it. Information that is subjectively new to a patent office15 may be introduced during the opposition 
proceedings. This may change the γ  type error, if there is one, from unsystematic to systematic (see 
above). Optimally we would be able to characterize informational change after grant when correlating 
them with the concordance of the EPO’s decision making. Unfortunately, when using electronic 
sources it is difficult (not to say impossible) to capture the precise informational change per patent.16 
For our data, we find one indicator only that can capture some of the dynamics (information increase 
over time). Namely, this is the forward citation indicator that we assume is to some extent a measure 
of informational change over time (Assumption 2). Forward citations received after the date of grant, 
but before the end of the opposition procedure, should correlate with observable inconsistencies of a 
patent office. Consequently, with the aforementioned set of assumptions, we propose: 
H3: If there is a significant difference in the EPO’s rulings for granting and opposition outcome 
decisions of patents, then this difference should be correlated with a patents’ forward citations 
received after the date of grant. 
In summary, H1 proposes that patent offices systematically assess patents. This is proposed to 
occur when a patent is initially assessed (Stage 1) and when it is re-assessed following a challenge 
(Stage 3). H2 proposes that systematic consistency across stages should exist in these assessments. We 
propose patent offices use available information to assess technological quality to their best abilities. 
This implies that quality-related information available at the date of grant is assessed identically 
                                                          
15  Of course it must not be objectively new since prior art is only judged until the date of filing. 
16  Currently, this information is only available in the form of scanned paper files that are substantially 
difficult to read/comprehend for the non-legal expert. Preparing this information for analysis is a challenging 
research project in itself that is left to future studies. Hence, we have no exact estimates of the precise 
informational change per patent. According to our interview partner in the Biotechnology Opposition Division of 
the European Patent Office, however, in most opposition proceedings additional information will be revealed 
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during examination (Stage 1) and opposition (Stage 3). We examine H3 only if inter-stage consistency 
does not hold. H3 involves testing our proposal that inconsistency can be explained and is not random; 
particularly, changes in information availability between grant and opposition are modeled. Failing 
this, we propose to examine an open-ended set of possible sources of inconsistencies. 
At this point, a disclaimer appears in order. In essence, our hypotheses suggest testing a model 
of patent quality as being a function of certain observable components (bibliographic indicators). Of 
course, the idiosyncratic nature of each patent remains unobservable. To that extent, the model must 
be somewhat mis-specified because a number of unobservable components are excluded. This 
however, should be of little concern, unless there is reason to believe that the omitted variables affect 
the coefficient estimates of our independent variables (bias). For this to happen, the omitted variables 
would need to systematically – not randomly – relate to a patent’s validity (the dependent variable) 
and correlate with (at least some of) the existing variables. While we can, by definition, never claim 
that we do not omit such variables, we deem the probability relatively low.17 With this assumption 
(Assumption 3), however, our tests relating to inter-stage inconsistency are valid. 
 
3.5 Methodological Aspects – Understanding the Scope and Usefulness of Variance 
Decomposition Discrete Choice Models for this Study 
The empirical methods we introduce and use in this paper do not (yet) belong to the standard 
repertoire used by empirical researchers in the patent arena. An in-depth description of our methods 
and summary of the background literature we draw upon requires considerable space. For brevity, 
Appendix B describes our empirical approach in considerable detail. We dedicate this section (Section 
3.5) to all other readers curious to obtain a fast working knowledge of the methods’ scope and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that was not considered during the examination. Cases like EP 93 114 141, where the opposition division bases 
its judgment on the same set of information as a patent examiner, are considered to be the exception. 
17  We draw this inference based on two observations. First, from the set of established patent indicators 
(see Reitzig, 2004: 948, for an overview) we use the better part in this paper. The correlations (see Appendix A) 
among all our regressor variables are very moderate. Moreover, we do not find changes in the significance of 
individual coefficients when dropping variables from the models in Tables 3 to 5. Hence, we think that the 
likelihood of overlooking another important bibliographic indicator causing an omitted variable bias is low. 
Second, bibliographic indicators appear to capture parts of the variance of a patent’s validity that are likely not 
proxied by other indicators we may be overlooking. See Reitzig (2004: 955) for an admittedly preliminary 
comparative test of bibliographic and other indicators. 
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comparative advantages relative to standard regressions used in the field, rather than familiarizing 
themselves with all the associated technical aspects. 
Referring the reader to Figure 1, we can formulate our overall testing goals as follows: does 
our matrix of indicators X capture patent office decisions about patent validity in Stage 1 (grant) and 
in Stage 3 (challenge) (H1)? That is, are β1 and β3 significant? On average, are vectors β1 and β3 
identical, recognizing that the difference between ε1 and ε3 must be accounted for (H2)? If β1 and β3 
are identical the EPO interpreted information on technological quality (proxied by X) consistently 
during both granting and challenge phases. If β1 and β3 are not identical, which elements of the vectors 
account for any inconsistencies (H3)?  
Testing H1 is a straightforward empirical problem for which we use standard binary discrete 
choice models (logit). Testing H2 and H3 is a bit trickier. In testing H2 and H3, we are hoping to make 
a direct comparison of how patent offices use available information to assess the quality of patents 
initially and upon challenge; this means comparing β1 and β3 (see Figure 1). The problem, however, is 
that in traditional choice models, estimates of β1 and β3 are inversely confounded with ε1 and ε3, 
respectively. Ultimately, a simple comparison of β1 and β3 is meaningless unless one can account for 
this confound. The random error components are different for numerous reasons; of major concern for 
this particular data set is that the set of Stage 3 observations are dependent on Stage 1 observations 
(“selection bias”). In particular, Stage 3 are the set of patents deemed to be of a high technological 
quality at Stage 1, but this has been questioned in the form of an opposition (the opponent implying 
that a patent was falsely granted). In turn, an ability to distinguish between valid and invalid patents in 
Stage 3, using the same set of indicators X as in Stage 1, is more difficult. That is, we expect the 
degree of error to differ in both stages, and that this will be reflected in ε1 and ε3.  
One solution to our testing problem comes in the form of variance decomposition discrete 
choice models (VDDCM). These models make explicit use of an empirical feature in discrete choice 
estimations that standard methods tend to “neglect” for the sake of simplicity. Namely, this is the so-
called distinction between “estimate” and “scale”. Standard discrete choice models (both simple and 
nested ones) estimate a vector β that is, in reality, not β but β times λ. Here, λ is a scale parameter of 
the random component and commonly set to unity in estimations. λ is inversely proportional to the 
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variance component, ε. Variance decomposition discrete choice models do not ignore λ, - unlike most 
choice models (including random coefficient models) - but separate the β (true estimate) and the λ 
(confounding scale parameter) from one another.  
By applying variance decomposition discrete choice models, we can disentangle spurious 
differences from true differences in assessments of technological quality during the grant and 
challenge phase. This allows us to correct for one of the most pressing problems created by the 
selection bias in the data for Stage 3.18 Moreover, we can use the methods to determine the nature of 
potential assessment inconsistencies when testing H3. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Data – Stratification Criteria and Descriptive Statistics 
For our analysis we chose biotechnology patent data from the 1970s and 1980s. This data 
allows us to examine a patent office’s ability to assess the technological quality of patents consistently. 
At this time, the biotechnological industry was novel and emerging (Orsigeno 1989). In turn, it creates 
a “quasi-experimental” set-up that should capture the characteristics of similar cases concerning 
Merges (1999); namely, it is a situation where little prior art appeared in patent databases, but would 
be more likely to be documented in scientific publications and other sources. The examiners in our 
analysis faced similar informational challenges to those experienced by examiners today in fields such 
as software or nanotechnology.19  
The selection of the industrial field was based on an updated version of the widely accepted 
OST INPI ISI classification by Schmoch (1994, personal note on an update from 1998). Biotech 
                                                          
18  The selection bias is also likely to change the distribution in a different way which we do not explicitly 
account for but which we deem less important in the context of this paper. With Priest & Klein (1984), Cooter & 
Rubinfeld (1989), and Waldfogel (1991), we assume that an opponent’s propensity to challenge a patent is 
driven by the value at stake as well as their subjectively perceived probability of winning the case. The 
opponents will initiate the opposition (see Lanjouw & Lerner, 1998; Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004; Reitzig, 2005) 
if: ( ) ( )oppositionlosepoppositionwinp opponentloseoppositionnoopponentwin ¦¦ ⋅−>⋅ πππ  where profits are those of the 
opponent. Hence, from a theoretical perspective we would expect not to see those patents in Stage 3 that are of 
very low techno-economic quality (since challenging them is worthless for the opponent, no matter how high the 
likelihood of winning) as well as those patents that are of extremely high legal quality (since challenging them 
appears pointless, no matter how valuable they are). Overall, however, we consider these two types of patents to 
be exceptions, delineating the margins of our overall distributions, and hence the issue negligible in this first 
study of patent assessment quality we conduct. This being said, it may be a worthwhile challenge to refine the 
estimation approach and custom-tailor it to the specific estimation problem in future studies on the subject. 
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patents were identified as showing one of the following IPC subclasses as their main classification: 
C07G; C12 M, N, P, Q, R, S. As of December 2003 (the date of data extraction) the European patent 
register contained 36,452 applications and 9,960 granted patents in these areas. 808 (8.11%) patents in 
the sample were opposed. For 558 of these opposed patents, a decision by the opposition division was 
observable. For the remaining part of patents, no clear ruling by the opposition division could be 
identified at that date (pending case either in opposition or appeal). Figure 2 shows the share of 
unidentified oppositions among the total sample versus the year of patent priority. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows a peak of unidentified opposition outcomes in the year 1985, which translates 
into an ascent from 1988 onwards. Pending a better explanation, we attribute this increase to the share 
of opposition cases still to be decided in December 2003 by the opposition division of the EPO. As 
this paper focuses on decisions of the opposition division, we remove patents applied for from 1988 
onwards. In doing so, we obtain a residual 7.2% of unidentified first ruling opposition cases (including 
appeals20 in some cases) between 1978 and 1987.21 Thus, the final data for analysis comprises 5,051 
patent applications, out of which 3,162 were granted. A total of 334 granted patents in that period were 
opposed. The number of outliers dropped for the estimations is 24 cases (< 0.5%). Table 2 contains the 
descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
The most important findings are the following. The rate of opposition in the biotechnology 
industry is high (10.56%), but it is lower than more litigious industries such as polymers (approx. 12% 
opposition between 1978 and 1990). Third parties invalidated patents in about 34% of all oppositions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
19  Or, as some of our interviewees at the EPO puts it: “in the early 1980s, examiners in The Hague did not 
even have data bases where they could look up prior art in the area of biotechnology”.  
20  Note: legally speaking, the opposition procedure comprises the (potential) subsequent appeal to the 
opposition. Appeals against the decisions of the Opposition Division can be made by all parties, patent holders 
and opponents, and are decided by the Board of Appeals.  As is intuitively understandable, appeals to 
oppositions delay the final outcomes of opposition cases even longer.  Hence, incorporating appeal decisions into 
opposition rulings would lead to even more data truncation problems than already present. Thus, for the purpose 
of this paper we focus on the first decision of the Opposition Division and not on the final decision by the Board 
of Appeals. We only include appeal decisions if they were decided before 2003 (extraction date) anyhow in 
order to avoid further truncation problems in the data. Admittedly, the data “quality” of our opposition rulings 
therefore differs as we incorporate the decision by the Board of Appeals in some cases. Even though we 
eventually deem this problem to be minor, this imperfection shall not be hidden from the reader. 
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Patents were amended in 32% of cases; opposition was rejected in 21% of cases because a challenge 
was not substantiated. In 13% of the remaining oppositions, the procedure was closed (7%) or no 
outcome identifiable (7%). Most of the explanatory variables appear within the “normal” range 
comparative to earlier studies, with some biotechnology specificities observable. On average, 2.9 
references to patents of prior art were made by the EPO examiners during the European search 
procedure. This figure is slightly low (e.g., polymer patents average 3.5). Each patent cites 2.6 non-
patent literature references as relevant state of the art. This figure is clearly higher than in more mature 
industries than biotech was in the 1980s. For example, polymer patents with priority dates 1977 and 
1990 filed at the EPO quote only 0.5 non-patent references as relevant state of the art. Hence, as 
expected, the sample shows some of the experimentally desired properties (see above) relating to prior 
art. On average, patents were applied for in 9 states (i.e. countries signing the EPC) and almost three 
inventors (2.8) were involved in each application. The average accelerated examination requests is 
fairly low, with about one percent of all patent applications following the Programme for Accelerated 
Prosecution of European Patent Applications (PACE). 10% of filings were made according to Chapter 
II of the Patent Corporation Treaty (PCT); this is lower than for the entire population of EP patents, 
but higher than in polymers for the same time period. This indicates that applicants delay costly 
decisions in more than 10% of the applications by choosing the PCT II route. Finally, we computed 
forward citations for two different periods of time (namely for five-year and ten-year time windows 
after the application’s publication date). We calculate different measures because of Hypothesis 3. In 
order to capture alterations in the information status about a patent’s technological quality over time 
we use forward citations as a proxy. Optimally, we would like to distinguish which citations the 
published patent application received before grant and that received afterwards. By calculating 
forward citations for different time spans (as described above) we obtain a proxy for this distinction. 
We find an average grant lag (time span from the filing date until the granting date) of 5.4 years and 
an opposition outcome lag (time span from granting date until date of opposition outcome) of 5.1 
years. Since forward citations were computed from the application date of a patent, 5-year forward 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
21  The resulting “imperfection” of the data set appears acceptable, considering that with 7.2% unidentified 
cases (including oppositions that we “deemed to be withdrawn”), the “disturbance” of the opposition outcome 
variable is negligible.  
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citations capture information that was available for patent examiners during the first 5 years after 
application. Hence, for about a half of our patents, all information contained in this variable was 
revealed during the EPO granting phase. Ceteris paribus, the forward citations calculated for the 10-
year time frame capture information revealed during the first 10 years after patent filing. For more 
than 95% of patents, this information falls at least partly into the period after patent grant. Finally, the 
difference between the two citation variables is an admittedly imperfect, but is a reasonable proxy for 
information revealed largely (i.e. for a large part of a patents in our sample) between grant and 
opposition outcomes.22 As expected, the average number of forward citations in subsequent EPO 
search procedures increases with the length of the time window. For a five and ten year period it is 
1.51 and 2.00, respectively.  
4.2 Hypothesis 1: Systematic Assessment of Patents (Application and Challenge Stages) 
According to Hypothesis 1, patent office assessments systematically relate to an observable set 
of quality indicators. These systematic assessments should be evident in the outcomes of Stage 1 
(grant; not grant) and, if applicable, the outcomes of Stage 3 (patent revoked/amended; patent 
maintained/granted). We estimated a binary choice model for each stage. The systematic component 
of assessments in Stage 1 and Stage 3 are captured by β1 and β3, respectively. In Table 3, the binary 
choice models (Grant; Oppo) map the outcomes in Stage 1 (granted; not granted) and, if applicable, in 
Stage 3 (patent revoked or patent amended vs. patent maintained as granted).23 The EPO’s decisions 
were modeled using the aforementioned patent indicators (number of references to patent and non-
patent literature; number of applicants and inventors; accelerated examination request; PCTI/II 
indicators; forward citations). We logarithmically transformed some of the explanatory variables when 
                                                          
22  Since grant and opposition outcome lags vary, fixed citation time windows will never exactly capture 
pre- and post grant information for all patents. We picked the time windows in such form, however, that this 
measurement error should be minimal on average. 
23  Note: the coding of the binary outcome for Stage 3 is based on the following consideration. While there is 
only one technological quality threshold in Stage 1 (non-Grant vs. Grant) there are in fact 2 thresholds in Stage 3 
(patent revocation vs. patent amendment and patent amendment vs. patent maintenance). Since, for econometric 
reasons, we need to boil down the complexity of Stage 3 to a binary decision we focused on the threshold in 
Stage 3 that would be most comparable to the granting threshold in Stage 1. Namely, whether a patent was 
upheld in exactly the same form as it was granted. Hence, we pooled the revocation and amendment of a patent 
on the one hand and the rejection of the opposition and the closure of the opposition procedure on the other (we 
dropped the cases of undecided oppositions). We preliminarily tested how our results would change if we coded 
the outcome in Stage 3 differently. These preliminary analyses suggest that the differences would not be radical, 
however, we did not inquire this in more detail. 
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(1) marginal effects of the variables on technological quality are decreasing (see Harhoff & Reitzig, 
2004) and (2) the distributions of the individual variables were highly left-skewed (see Table 1). 
We first estimate both models separately. The scale parameters (which inversely relate to the 
variance of random/error component) associated with each decision stage, λ1 and λ3, are not 
identifiable and arbitrarily set to unity. The estimates are provided in Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
We first examine the initial patent assessment decision in Stage 1 (model Grant), consistent 
with our framework of assumptions and in keeping with prior literature – in particular Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe (2000). Our results suggest that we can proxy patent office assessments of technological 
quality using our set of indicators X – this supports Hypothesis 1. The model is overall well specified 
(p<0.001). We obtain individually and jointly significant coefficients for the variables relating to 
backward references to patent literature, accelerated examination requests, number of inventors, and 
forward citations received within five years of the publication date. Counter intuitively, the family size 
variable (coded as the ln[1+number of designated states]) correlates negatively with the likelihood of a 
patent being granted. We can only speculate about this finding; one plausible explanation is that large 
and cost-insensitive firms, with patenting tactics that cover wider product markets significantly more 
often, file patents for incremental inventions with a higher likelihood of not being granted. 
Admittedly, this explanation may be challenged. 
The model of opposition outcomes in Stage 3 (model Oppo) suggests that the factors that were 
significant for granting initially are no longer significant. The overall model is badly specified (with 
p=0.30 the model is overall insignificant) – suggesting that the coefficients of the variables are not 
significantly different from zero; one important consequence would be to reject Hypothesis 1. For 
various reasons, we do not lean towards this interpretation. The most important one is sample size. In 
fact, when running Model Grant (Stage 1) on randomly chosen subsets of data comprising roughly 300 
observations, we do not obtain significant results, either – whereas we do obtain them for N=5,027 
observations (Table 3). Thus, the insignificant coefficients from Model Oppo (Stage 3) are likely to be 
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affected by the comparatively small N – and we estimate inefficiently.24 Given this, and considering 
the substantial empirical evidence of our indicators’ ability to capture phenomena related to 
technological quality in Stage 1 (see Table 1, see Section 3.3), we are inclined to give more weight to 
the findings of that model. In turn we proceed with our analysis under the assumption that H1 is 
fulfilled for our specific set of data. 
4.3 Hypothesis 2: Inter-stage Consistency in Assessment of Patent Quality 
 According to Hypothesis 2, patent offices use quality-related information in a systematic and 
identical fashion to assess the underlying quality of a patent initially (granting phase) and upon 
reassessment (challenge phase). Our time-invariant indicators capture information that should be 
identical at the day of grant and at the day of opposition. Comparing the estimates relating to these 
indicators at each stage will reveal whether the EPO is consistent in their decision-making. We do this 
in model 4 but account for potentially spurious results in the β’s arising from differing error structures 
(as reflected in the ε’s and, hence, λ’s, see Section 3.5). Econometrically speaking, in this model we 
test whether coefficients for X are consistent when variance components from the two data sets on 
grant (stage 1) and opposition (stage 3) are allowed to differ. That is, we introduce the restriction β1 = 
β3 = β, given λ1 ≠ λ3. As described in detail in Appendix B, the data for stages 1 and 3 are pooled for 
this test and treated as independent data sets.25 We interpret the overall goodness of the model by 
focusing on the likelihood ratio values. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The estimates are shown in Table 4. It is clear that the successful rescaling procedure is 
questionable, given a negative scale ratio. Specifically, since the scale is inversely related to the 
variance, in a correct and acceptable model this ratio must be positive. This is confirmed when 
comparing the proposed model to the unrestricted model. The likelihood-ratio value is 23.99, which is 
greater than the χ2 value of 18.31. As a result, we conclude that once differences in variability are 
                                                          
24  This problem of inefficient estimation should become smaller once we pool the sub samples 
(see Tables 4,5, and 6) in order to test hypotheses 2 and 3. Note again that a simple comparison of  the 
absolute sizes of the coefficients for X in Models Grant (Stage 1) and Oppo (Stage 3) to test H2 and 
H3 are meaningless since they may be the result of a spurious scale artifact (biased). 
25  See FN 19: resulting imperfections from this assumption in our empirical design offer, in our eyes, 
scope for future research, however, they do, in our understanding, not preclude our first careful analysis 
presented in this paper. 
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accounted for, the model 4 in which we propose that the office shows consistent assessments about a 
patent’s technological quality across both granting and opposition stages (Hypothesis 2) is not 
supported (its H0 is not rejected). In turn, one should examine the restricted estimates with caution26. 
 
4.4 Hypothesis 3: Theoretical Sources of Inter-stage Inconsistency in Assessment of Patent 
Quality – Informational changes between grant and opposition 
According to Hypothesis 3, potential inconsistencies are attributable to incremental knowledge 
obtained after the day of grant. That is, we attempt to account for beneficial hindsight knowledge 
provided to opposition division members. Using incremental forward citations received largely after 
grant as a proxy for hindsight information, model 5 tests H3 in a way that is comparable to our testing 
of H2, but for one important difference: in model 5 we estimate a pooled model of the two assessment 
stages where some combination of assessment homogeneity and assessment heterogeneity by the EPO 
is imposed, while still allowing variance heterogeneity to exist. It is important to note that we restrict 
the model so that the assessment heterogeneity may only be explained by the incremental forward 
citations, our proxy for hindsight information. This is in line with our theoretical expectation (H3). Of 
course, patent offices should systematically consider other (= time invariant) aspects of technological 
quality in the same way (i.e., consistent) across the two periods of assessment.27 Econometrically 
speaking, in model 5 we introduce identical restrictions to model 4 (β1=β3) and the same relaxed 
assumptions relating to the error terms (λ1≠λ2), but introduce the β representing information changes 
(k=10) as a heterogeneous parameter (i.e., βk=10_Stage1≠βk=10_Stage3).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
The results indicate that Model 5 proposes a set of restrictions that do not enable the model 
estimates to converge to an acceptable solution, That is, the data sets cannot be combined simply by 
                                                          
26  We caution the reader to interpret the model estimates. Essentially, we proposed that we can estimate a 
model in which the bibliographical indicators of quality were used in an identical fashion to judge quality in 
stages 1 and 3, recognizing the errors at the two stages differ. Hence, this would imply only a single set of 
estimates are required. This model was rejected, which indicates that the ‘k’ estimates themselves are 
misleading. 
27  The reader may note that in model 5 we drop the forward citations received until grant (5-year frame) 
from the set of homogenous parameters. We do so to avoid obtaining potentially confounding collinearity effects 
between the forward citation measures. Essentially, our parameterization in model 5 therefore gives the data the 
“maximum chance” to show consistency across Stages 1 and 3. 
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rescaling and with a single heterogeneous parameter. This is since the model introduced is overly 
restrictive (note: this result holds even when introducing a heterogeneous intercept term to allow for 
different propensities in the granting or upholding of patents by the office; the results of this test are 
not shown, but available upon request). The results suggest that a model of consistency in patent 
assessment (as proxied by indicators of patent quality) over assessment stages cannot be supported, 
even when allowing for different levels of error and possible information changes as proxied by 
incremental forward citations.  
We can, therefore, formulate an important interim summary: within the framework of our 
assumptions, particularly with an assumption that bibliographic indicators can act as proxies for 
validity-related information, we do not find that the EPO assessed technology related information 
consistently between grant and opposition during the 1980s in the area of biotechnology. The 
inconsistency we observe is not solely attributable to informational change between grant or challenge 
decisions. 
While we think that our tests support our conclusions quite substantially, we reiterate that it is 
not the aim of the paper to downplay any individual’s efforts at the EPO to deliver the best possible 
service during the period we study. We do not make conclusions of low assessment quality based on 
an isolated empirical affirmation. Instead, we prefer to examine (self-)critically which technical 
premises and theoretical aspects of our research design should be relaxed to explain our empirical 
findings comprehensively. The following Section is dedicated to doing this.  
4.5 Investigating Further Potential Sources of Inter-Stage Inconsistency 
In testing our research hypotheses, we concluded that the office may use indicators of patent 
quality in a systematic fashion (H1), but do so in a inconsistent fashion at the two stages of 
assessment; namely upon initial patent assessment and upon challenge. This was evident even when 
correcting for the confound in parameter estimates introduced by difference in error structures (H2) 
and allowing for informational changes to be heterogeneously assessed (H3). In other words, 
hypotheses 2 and 3 are rejected.  
To this extent, we are motivated to investigate further reasons why our proposal of 
homogeneity (and hence, consistency), as well as theoretically comprehensible heterogeneity, is 
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rejected. Could it be that simply one or a few bibliographical indicators (i.e., parameters 2 through 9) 
are the pieces of information which reflect inconsistent assessments? Or could it be that a completely 
different set of criteria is used to judge patent quality in challenge stages and that the rectification of γ 
errors by the office is difficult to comprehend relative to their assessments made in Stage 1? Perhaps 
the answer is somewhere in between? In models 6a and 6b we propose and test whether inconsistency 
in the EPO’s ruling – as found in 4.3 – is driven by only a few of the informational indicators we use; 
thereby this test relaxes the assumption that hindsight knowledge may only be captured by incremental 
forward citations (Assumption 2). Secondly, we relax our framework by dropping the assumption 
which states the EPO worked with constant conditions over time (Assumption 1); in other words, we 
allow for the γ errors to be driven by pure time-trend contingencies. These contingencies may be 
exogenous to examiners and members of opposition divisions, or reflect their own behavior (e.g. their 
learning about the new technologies). 
To relax Assumption 2, we estimate a model that is similar to model 5, however, we make no 
prediction or impose no restriction on assessment heterogeneity. Any of our indicators may now 
capture heterogeneous assessments. In searching for sources of heterogeneity (inconsistency), we 
tested several models to identify a potential set of parameters accounting for the heterogeneity. Table 6 
presents the results of two specifications which emerged as the most significant and stable ones after 
comprehensive testing. Moreover, we split Table 6 into columns A (restricted parameter set without 
incremental forward citations) and B (parameter set including the incremental forward citations 
received after granting). By contrast, the two models provide an additional indication on the usefulness 
of our incremental forward citations to measure informational change after grant. It also serves as a 
robustness check for our rejection of H3.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
The findings show distinct variables are driving the variance heterogeneity across assessment 
Stages 1 and 3 in both models 6a and 6b. Namely, these are accelerated examination request; number 
of inventors; absolute number of forward cites received within 5 years after publication (in model 6a); 
and incremental forward citations received between 5 and 10 years after application (in model 6b). We 
cannot offer a rational explanation for why a patent office would interpret information correlated with 
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acceleration requests or the number of inventors differently across the granting and opposition stage. 
On the other hand, it is intuitive why the incremental forward cites (received between five and ten 
years after publication) exhibit variance heterogeneity. Specifically, the variable was included to 
capture potential informational changes over time in model 5. It appears to show the desired effect 
only in a model which is less restricted (6b). It is somewhat puzzling that forward citations within the 
5-year period are also driving heterogeneity (model 6a). Theoretically, this variable should not exhibit 
any variance heterogeneity across assessment stages. The correlation structure among the independent 
variables suggests, however, that a moderate correlation between incremental forward cites and 5-year 
time frame forward cites is driving this result. This correlation as well as the measurement error of this 
variable in picking up pre- vs post-grant information leads us to revisit the ability of our measures to 
pick information status at different stages, and address this in our discussion. 
To relax Assumption 1, we re-ran models 6a and 6b including a set of time dummies to 
capture the variance in the EPO’s decision-making on patent validity over time above and beyond its 
(re-)assessment of technological quality for identical patent (application)s. We created time dummies 
for each patent filing year to capture the contingencies of providing services that are (a) exogenous 
from an examiners perspective (i.e. change in fee structures, change in number of applications, etc.), 
and (b) reflect examiner behavior (e.g. learning).28 Our results are summarized in Figure 3: 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
The reader may note the time trend created by the significant coefficients of the time dummies 
on the probability of a patent being held valid (all else being equal). The years 1978 and 1979 were 
combined due to a lack of observations in Stage 3 for patents being filed in these years,  and acted as 
the reference year in the estimation (hence, the coefficient equal zero by default). Of importance, but 
not visible from Figure 3, is that almost all remaining indicators of technological assessment quality 
are insignificant in VDDC models 6a and 6b (except backward references to patent literature for both 
models and PCT I for Model 6a)29  Finally, with the exception of the two (one) indicators, model 6a 
                                                          
28  This approach does not allow us to disentangle fully exogenous effects from the perspective of patent 
examiners/opposition divisions from endogenous ones. 
29  Readers familiar with the use of European patent data may wonder whether these last results could, in 
part be driven by the fact that some of our measures, while time-invariant for the individual patent, show 
distributional changes over our sampling period (e.g. the maximum number of states to be designated changed 
from 1978 until 1987). We can not exclude that this is the case to some extent; however, if it was, this would 
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(6b) that include additional time dummies show overall support for H2. In summary, for our sample – 
and within our framework of assumptions – the EPO was consistent in its rulings on patent validity, 
but its decisions were not based on assessments of patents’ technological quality; instead decisions 




Our discussion begins with some considerations about the robustness of our findings, as well 
as a repeated disclaimer.  
Conceptually, our analysis focuses on only one aspect of patent assessment quality, although it 
is an important one. We study assessment inconsistencies arising from errors (we term these γ errors), 
which occur when a poor patent – one that should never be granted – is granted. The isolated 
inspection of γ errors may be misleading when assessing overall/total patent assessment quality.30 This 
is because, theoretically, the desirability of γ errors is dependent upon patent offices having 
mechanisms in place to correct for β errors (i.e., falsely rejected patent applications during grant). If an 
institution has a harsh granting procedure and the number of falsely rejected patent applications is 
high, then the risk for γ errors occurring is likely to be low; the need for institutional features to correct 
for γ errors (falsely granted patents), therefore, will also be low. Conversely, if there is a mechanism to 
correct for β type errors, there must be mechanisms in place to deal with γ errors. The EPO has 
mechanisms in place for correcting both β and γ  type errors. β errors (falsely rejected applications) 
can be corrected through the “appeal to grant” procedure. A profound analysis of this institutional 
feature would be beyond the scope of this paper, but the reader may note the following descriptive 
statistics. Out of our sample of 5,051 patent applications, 81 grant examination decisions were 
appealed. Out of the 3,162 granted patents, 334 were opposed and 79% of those were admitted for 
opposition. We have no objective yardstick against which to measure these figures; we do, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
render our results even more powerful – unless one assumes that bibliographic measures are unsuited to proxy 
technological quality.  
30  We thank one of our referees of this paper for encouraging us to delve deeper into this discussion – 
which we deem very important. 
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find the number of appeals to be relatively high considering that the discrimination between patent 
validity in Stage 1 should, on average, be easier than in Stage 3 (see our aforementioned arguments). 
Hence, we interpret this figure as an indication that the EPO’s “appeal against examination” procedure 
is avidly used. Thus, we do further assume that the desirability for the EPO to commit γ errors is 
limited, reinforcing our argument to study γ errors as an important indicator of overall patent 
assessment quality. 
Empirically speaking, we recall that our results are based on the assumption that the 
bibliographic indicators we adopt allow operationalizing a patent’s technological quality. In general, 
we consider this assumption unproblematic since it is supported by an extant literature in the field. 
Moreover, model Grant (Table 3) indicates that this is a reasonable assumption for our specific data if 
N is large enough, too (see also Appendix Table A2). We are aware that our indicators are correlates 
of the EPO’s informational decision making basis and not causal for EPO’s decision-making. We do 
not claim that our indicators capture the technological quality concept: we are aware that our 
estimations may be systematically underspecified. However, we do not see why at least those 
indications about a patent’s quality we can measure should exhibit different effects in patent quality 
assessments across different stages (granting vs. opposition procedure). Moreover, we assume that the 
incremental forward citations received between 5 and 10 years after patent grant are, for the majority 
of patents within this sample, a good first proxy for the informational change regarding a patent’s 
technological quality between the day of grant and the day of the opposition outcome (Assumption 1). 
The average time lags for patent granting and opposition decisions as observed for our data render this 
assumption plausible. We know, however, that the variable dos not capture the entire change in 
information for some patents. Moreover, our incremental forward citation measure is unlikely to 
reflect oral information on “prior use” of a technology introduced during the opposition phase. In any 
case, the proxy does not allow us to determine the type of informational change with precision. 
Empirically speaking, the correlation between the different forward citation measures and their similar 
impact on consistency (models 6a and 6b) caution us not to over-interpret related results. Finally, 
except for our final estimations (see Figure 3), we assume that the conditions with which the EPO 
operates over time are constant and, if it is not constant, this should not affect the EPO’s decision 
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making (Assumption 2). We will critically review the suitability of this assumption in the following 
section and discuss implications of our findings relating to assessment (in)consistency.  
5.2 (In)Consistent Technology-Based Assessments?  
 Stimulated by the ongoing discussion about patent assessment quality, this paper sought to 
generate robust empirical evidence on various questions. First, we asked: what is the degree of 
technology-based decision-making consistency between validity-related decisions during patent grant 
and patent opposition? The question relates back to two fundamental issues of patent quality; namely, 
whether patent granting procedures are reliable by (a) categorizing patent applications along a 
yardstick of technological quality; and (b) ensuring that a patent survives a subsequent “validity suit” 
in emerging patenting areas. The answer to this question is easily summarized: within our framework 
of assumptions, Hypothesis 2 is rejected. This means that, for the entire sample of biotechnology 
patents applied for between 1978 and 1987 at the EPO, we do not observe consistent rulings by the 
office in the sense that the EPO assessed identical information on patentability requirements 
(technological quality) differently at the day of grant and the day of the opposition.  
5.3 Sources of Inconsistency 
Second, we asked: what are the sources of inconsistent judgments between patent grant and 
challenge (opposition)? While our analysis does not permit us to answer this question conclusively, we 
offer the following response: the technology-related informational change observed between the day 
of grant and the day of the opposition outcome is, to the extent that it is captured by the incremental 
forward citations, not entirely driving the assessment inconsistencies. This finding follows from our 
rejection of H3. Essentially, the interpretation of identical information, rather than the interpretation of 
different information, drives inconsistent assessments.  
5.4 Desired Inconsistency?  
Third, we posed the question: what we can infer from these findings on the level of service 
quality provided by the EPO in the area of biotechnology during the 1980s? While our assumptions 
and the limits of our empirical design require drawing conclusions carefully, the following appears 
noteworthy. Our results do not support the finding that patent validity-related decisions were based on 
consistent assessments of objective technological quality.  
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We do not find strong indications that the EPO attempted to optimize its service quality. To 
illustrate, consider the following counterfactual chain of thoughts: had the inconsistencies between 
patent grant and patent opposition been largely attributable to a change in information about a patents’ 
validity between the day of grant and the day of opposition, then this would have been an indication 
that the EPO allocates only limited resources to the search of prior art to patent examiners. 
Consequently, this would have led to the discovery of information during opposition that was 
‘overlooked’ during examination. If this was the case, however, one might suggest that the EPO 
provided service quality conditional upon resource constraints (see Merges, 1999), rather than being 
entirely “rationally ignorant” (see Lemley, 2001). Such a conditional resource allocation would 
suggest the EPO did optimize its service quality. Empirically, however, we do not obtain any findings 
suggesting information changes can explain inconsistencies of the EPO; in turn, we therefore second-
guess that the EPO optimized its service quality. Admittedly, the limited explanatory power of our 
measure of informational change over time (incremental forward citations) asks one to treat this 
conclusion with caution. Whether our findings truly reflect an optimal allocation rationale for search 
resources between granting and opposition by the office remains a partly open question to be 
addressed in future research.  
Quite clearly, however, inconsistent assessments regarding identical information during the 
grant and the challenge phase is not desirable in any circumstances.31 Essentially, this inconsistency is 
a “human” error. If available, patent offices should consider options to reduce this error. For example, 
patent offices could grant examiners more time or offer greater training and education – especially in 
“emerging” patenting areas. Given Merges’ suggestions, these options may benefit patent offices in 
the long-run as it requires considerable time to find and interpret prior art. The time trend we plot in 
Figure 3 may be attributable, not only to the changing environmental conditions with which examiners 
operate, but also to their “learning” in new technological areas.32 Such measures, however, do not 
guarantee that “undesired” inconsistency will vanish. If there is a chance that patent offices are, for 
                                                          
31  In fact, only with Lemley (2001) one might argue that it may be a reflection of an optimal resource 
allocation policy of a patent office if examiners and opposition division judge identical information differently. 
Namely, if one argues that not only resources for the search of prior art but also resources for the interpretation 
of prior art should be allocated mainly to the opposition division. We do not elaborate further on this thought for 
reasons given in 2.1.  
32  We thank one of our reviewers for sharing this thought with us. 
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one reason or another, incapable of guaranteeing a high level of consistency at reasonable costs – or 
normative legal quality (Thomas, 2002) – in emerging technologies, what would other options be to 
improve the system? Is there value to introducing a “grace period” for granting patents in new 
technologies? In other words, should society wait and observe a technological area before it acts and 
offers mechanisms for protection? What are the opportunity costs of this approach? These questions 
are highly relevant for future research endeavors examining patent quality. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Stimulated by the ongoing discussion about patent quality, this paper sought to generate robust 
empirical evidence on the following two questions: (1) Did the European Patent Office (EPO) 
consistently base (repeated) patent validity decisions on its judgments of technological quality? (2) 
What were the sources of inconsistent judgments (if any) between patent grant and challenge? 
Moreover, we considered what our findings reveal about whether the EPO allocates resources 
optimally between the grant and the challenge phases.  
Using data on European biotechnology patents filed between 1978 and 1987, we show that the 
EPO’s decision making on a patent’s technological quality during granting and opposition phases 
(“validity suit”) was inconsistent; to the extent we can measure this using bibliographic indicators. 
Moreover, we do not find compelling evidence that the inconsistency indicates “optimal” resource 
allocation in a way that can be explained by informational increases on a patent’s technological quality 
from granting until the end of the opposition procedure. While there is some indication that 
information about a patent after its granting accounts for some of the differences in patentability 
assessments over time, we have no conclusive empirical evidence for this. This implies that examiners 
and opposition divisions judge identical information in different ways. We argue this is undesirable. 
Our results are subject to several caveats. In particular, issues of specification (unobserved 
contingencies), specific model assumptions (correlation of error term structures), and preliminary 
character of our measure for informational change over time (= incremental forward citations) may 
distort our findings. In addition, we focus on one emerging patenting area, prohibiting us from making 
any undue generalizations. 
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This being said, we would prefer to think that we make several contributions and extend the 
current debate on patent quality. We believe that this paper provides the first large-scale empirical test 
of patent assessment quality according to a definition that captures both economic and legal 
dimensions of patent quality. In addition, our tests are carried out within only one office and one 
industry, but earlier studies compare different industries with one another and face potential problems 
relating to the neglect of important contingencies. 
We know of no prior study that exploits patent data for the aforementioned research question 
beyond the level of rather simple comparisons of average indicator variables. Important information 
regarding the consistency of decision-making of a patent office may be hidden in (or distorted by) the 
variances of these indicator variables; our study is the first to exploit the heterogeneity and richness of 
patent data to shed more light on a patent quality discussion. 
As in many research endeavors, our study has left us with many questions. Some issues we 
deemed important were raised in the discussion, and, in our view, present stimuli for future research. 
In order to understand the generality of our findings, a comparison of the biotechnology industry in the 
1980s with a mature patenting area (e.g., modern polymers) may provide insights. Such a study 
comparable to this one, but using patent data from a different technology, could shed light on the 
question whether Merges’ (1999) criticism is limited to new patenting areas, or whether problems may 
exist in other technological areas. In order to understand the sources of inconsistent rulings, qualitative 
research may be worthwhile. We see little space for “squeezing” existing bibliographic data further 
than in this context, and we would expect good survey or archival data to help identify these sources. 
This particularly applies to the variables capturing the precise informational change between patent 
grant and opposition. Finally, our study focused on γ  errors (false grants) exclusively. A comparative 
study focusing on β  errors (falsely non-granted applications) might reveal additional insights about 
the total service quality provided by the EPO. 
II 
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33  Note that in order to calculate the time intercepts in Figure 3 we had to adjust the parameterization of  

















































Detailed description of measure Coding Link to technological quality (degree of novelty and inventive step):rationales 
(-: moderate negative correlation; +: moderate positive; ++: strongly positive) 
Basic reference 
Number of Backward 
Citations to a patent 
Literature  
Number of patent references to the state of the art that are 
actively quoted by a patent 
Logarithmic ++: the more developed a technological area, the greater the involvement of professional 
(corporate) inventors, and hence the higher likelihood of the focal patent being of high 
technological quality 
-: the more developed a technological area, the more marginal the focal patent’s contribution 
 
Narin, Noma & Perry 
(1987) 
Number of Backward 
Citations to the Non-
Patent Literature 
Number of non-patent references to the state of the art 
that are actively quoted by a patent 
Logarithmic +: the closer a patent application is to “basic” research, as reflected by the non-patent 
references, the higher its technological quality (relevant for scientific references) 
 
-: the less “scientific” a backward reference, the lower the technological quality (relevant for 
non-scientific references) 





Number of states  Logarithmic  +: the higher the applicant’s willingness to pay for enlarged territorial protection, the higher a 
patent’s value (and, hence, potentially its technological merit) 
 
-: the larger a potential market for a patent, the higher the likelihood of the focal patent being 
an incremental contribution and therefore of low technological quality 




Number of applicants (natural and legal persons) 
involved in the application for a patent 
Binary ++: the more applicants contribute resources to the research and development process 
underlying the focal patent, the higher the resulting technological quality 
Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
Number of Inventors Number of inventors (only natural persons) involved in 
the application for a patent 
Logarithmic ++: the more inventors participate in the research and development process underlying the 
focal patent, the higher the resulting technological quality 
Ernst, Leptien, & Witt 
(2000) 
Number of Forward 
Citations (5-year 
frame) 
Number of times the focal patent was quoted as relevant 
state of the art (prior art) during examinations of 
subsequent patent applications filed within five years 
after application of the focal patent application 
Logarithmic ++: the more often a focal patent is quoted as prior art during examinations of subsequent 
patent examinations, the more fundamental its technological contribution to the field, the 




Number of times the focal patent was quoted as relevant 
state of the art (prior art) during examinations of 
subsequent patent applications filed within the period of 
five to ten years after publication of the focal patent 
application 
Logarithmic See above; the effect of the incremental forward cites should, however, play out particularly 




(1: yes, 0: no) 
Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if a request was 
filed for an accelerated production of the search report 
Binary +: the higher the applicant’s willingness to pay for accelerated protection, the higher the 
private value of a patent (and, hence, likely the technological quality of a patent) 
 
-: the higher the necessity to receive accelerated protection, the more incremental the invention 
Reitzig (2004) 
PCT I & II (1: yes, 0: 
no) 
Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if a patent was 
filed via Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) in order to 
seek global protection, and if the period of time between 
filing date and entry into the regional phase is 20 months 
or less (PCT I) / exceeds 20 months (PCT II).  
Binary +: the higher the applicant’s willingness to invest in global protection for the focal patent 
(exceeding the EP territory), the higher a patent’s commercial value (and, likely, its 
technological quality) 
 
-: the higher the applicant’s willingness to pay for the delay of cost-intensive decisions during 
the application, the higher the applicant’s uncertainty about the focal patent’s commercial 
value (and, likely, its technological quality) 
Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000) 
 
For the differences 
between PCT I and PCT 
II see Reitzig (2004) 
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Left-hand side variables 
 
Opposition (1: yes, 0: no)1) 0.11  0 1 
Rejection of Opposition (1: yes, 0: no) 2) 0.21  0 1 
Amendment after Opposition (1: yes, 0: no) 2) 0.32  0 1 
Revocation of Patent after Opposition (1: yes, 0: 
no) 2) 
0.34  0 1 
Opposition Procedure Closed (1: yes, 0: no) 2) 0.07  0 1 
Opposition Outcome not Definable (1: yes, 0: no) 
2) 
0.07  0 1 
 
Exogenous variables (right-hand side) 
 
Number of Backward Citations to patent 
Literature (incl. international search)3) 
2.90 2.44 0 22 
Number of Backward Citations to the Non-Patent 
Literature (incl. international search)3) 
2.64 2.91 0 41 
Number of Designated States (Family Size) 3) 8.97 3.05 1 13 
Number of Applicants3) 1.12 0.43 1 7 
Number of Inventors3) 2.84 1.74 1 19 
Number of Forward Citations (5-year frame) 3) 1.51 2.79 0 37 
Number of Forward Citations (10-year frame) 3) 2.00 3.32 0 44 
Accelerated Examination Request (1: yes, 0: no) 3) 0.02  0 1 
PCT I (1: yes, 0: no) 3) 4) 0.03  0 1 
PCT II (1: yes, 0: no) 3) 4) 0.10  0 1 
 
Legend:  1): Figures calculated for the sample of granted patents comprising N=3,162 patents 
2):  Figures calculated for the sample of opposed patents comprising N=334 patents. 
3):  Figures calculated for the entire sample comprising N=5,051 patent (application)s. 
4): PCTI and PCT II are distinguished from one another based on the time elapsed between the patent’s priority date and the  
entry into the regional phase. Theoretically, the time lapsed should never exceed 30 months. For a small fraction (8%) of our 
PCT cases we do observe lags that exceed 30 months, however. We were not able to resolve this puzzle, but we deem it 










Stage One: Impact of Patent Quality on Probability of Patent Being 
Granted relative to Not Granted upon Application 
 




Stage Three: Impact of Patent Quality on Probability of Patent Being 
Upheld relative to being Revoked or Amended upon Challenge 
 
Excluding Information Revealed Largely After Patent Grant 
 
K Parameter Est. B s.e.  Est. B s.e.  
1 Intercept -0.1407 0.2105   -1.3659 1.2509  
2 ln(1+patent references) 0.2480 0.0479 ** 0.2226 0.2078  
3 ln(1+non-patent references) 0.0346 0.0416   -0.2001 0.1772  
4 ln(# designated states) -0.2276 0.0645 ** 0.4397 0.4631  
5 Acc. Exam. Request 0.7923 0.2890 ** -0.9651 0.7875  
6 Applicant (=1) 0.1216 0.1061   -0.1962 0.4605  
7 ln(1+ # inventors) 0.4320 0.0741 ** -0.1757 0.3130  
8 PCTI (=1) 0.2765 0.1775   0.8807 0.5726  
9 PCTII (=1) -0.1628 0.1031   -0.6366 0.5606  
10a ln(1+5-year cites) 0.2865 0.0466 ** -0.0861 0.1529  
  Log-Likelihood (0): -3484.45; Log-L (model): -3249.09 Log-Likelihood (0): -214.876; Log-L (model): -182.323 
* - significant at the α=.05 level; ** - significant at the α=.01 le
 XI 
Table 4 
Model of CompleteHomogeneity (with Scale/Variance Heterogeneity) 
Stages 1 (Patent Grant) and 3 (Opposition Outcome) Pooled 
 
 
  Model 4 
Excluding Information Revealed Largely After Patent Grant 
(N=5337) 
 
K Parameter Est. B s.e. t-stat p-value   
 
1 Intercept -0.0718 0.1282 -0.5603 0.5753   
2 ln(1+patent references) 0.1394 0.0289 4.8161 0.0000 ** 
3 
ln(1+non-patent 
references) 0.0289 0.0251 1.1494 0.2504   
4 ln(# designated states) -0.1379 0.0396 -3.4822 0.0005 ** 
5 Acc. Exam. Request 0.5181 0.1693 3.0602 0.0022 ** 
6 Applicant (=1) 0.0787 0.0643 1.2247 0.2207   
7 ln(1+ # inventors) 0.2634 0.0448 5.8745 0.0000 ** 
8 PCTI (=1) 0.1169 0.1046 1.1176 0.2637   
9 PCTII (=1) -0.0813 0.0627 -1.2969 0.1947   
10a ln(1+5-year cites) 0.1707 0.0275 6.2148 0.0000 ** 
  
Scale Parameter 
     
 Scale (Stage 1) 1.6117 0.0774 20.8274 0.0000 ** 
 Scale (Stage 3) -1.4870 0.2457 -6.0525 0.0000 ** 
  Log-Likelihood (0): -3699.327; Log-L (model): -3436.408 




Model of Partial Heterogeneity Relating to Post Grant Information (with Scale/Variance 
Heterogeneity) 








K Parameter Est. B s.e. t-stat p-value   
  Homogeneous Parameters           
1 Intercept -0.1401 0.1239 -1.1304 0.2583   
2 ln(1+patent references) 0.1386 0.0276 5.0167 0.0000 ** 
3 ln(1+non-patent references) 0.0277 0.0244 1.1335 0.2570   
4 ln(# designated states) -0.1277 0.0378 -3.3761 0.0007 ** 
5 Acc. Exam. Request 0.4671 0.1703 2.7433 0.0061 ** 
6 Applicant(=1) 0.0741 0.0626 1.1845 0.2362   
7 ln(1+ # inventors) 0.2899 0.0436 6.6487 0.0000 ** 
8 PCTI(=1) 0.1624 0.1034 1.5705 0.1163   
9 PCTII(=1) -0.0981 0.0589 -1.6662 0.0957   
10b ln(incremental forward cites) -218.8216^ 54.1432 -4.0415 0.0001 ** 
       
  Heterogeneous Parameters           
10b ln(incremental forward cites) -219.2145^ 54.1432 -4.0488 0.0001 ** 
  Scale Parameters           
 Scale (Stage 1) 1.7017 0.0795 21.3954 0.0000 ** 
  Scale (Stage 3) 0.0015 0.0004 4.0401 0.0001 ** 
    
Log-Likelihood (0):-3699.327;  
Log-L (model):-3424.83 
^ - model failed to converge after 1000 iterations; large standard errors/biased estimates indicate overly 
restrictive model structure. 




Covariance Heterogeneity Model with Mixture of Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Systematic Assessment Parameters 
Stages 1 (Patent Grant) and 3 (Opposition Outcome) Pooled 
 
  Model 6a 








(lambda) s.e. t-stat p-value   Est. B s.e. t-stat p-value   
 Homogenous parameters           
 
1 Intercept -0.5744 0.3296 -1.7426 0.0814   -0.7318 0.4053 -1.8057 0.0710   
2 ln(1+patent references) 0.1808 0.0343 5.2672 0.0000 ** 0.2012 0.0397 5.0673 0.0000 ** 
3 ln(1+non-patent references) 0.0139 0.0298 0.4676 0.6401   0.0273 0.0350 0.7786 0.4362   
4 ln(# designated states) 0.0106 0.1285 0.0822 0.9345   0.0149 0.1569 0.0948 0.9245   
5 Acc. Exam. Request 0.0193 0.2452 0.0787 0.9372   0.0154 0.2977 0.0517 0.9588   
6 Applicant (=1) 0.0739 0.0767 0.9645 0.3348   0.0909 0.0905 1.0041 0.3153   
7 ln(1+ # inventors) 0.1264 0.0912 1.3865 0.1656   0.1591 0.1096 1.4519 0.1465   
8 PCTI(=1) -0.1354 0.0747 -1.8127 0.0699   -0.1581 0.0854 -1.8498 0.0643   
9 PCTII(=1) 0.0854 0.0417 2.0488 0.0405 * -0.7318 0.4053 -1.8057 0.0710   
10a ln(1+5-year cites) -0.5744 0.3296 -1.7426 0.0814   - - - -  
10b Ln (incremental forward cites) - - - - - 0.2907 0.0785 3.7038 0.0002 ** 
  
Heterogeneous parameters            
1 Intercept -0.5032 0.3157 -1.5938 0.1110   -0.5612 0.3900 -1.4391 0.1501   
4 ln(# designated states) 0.1810 0.1282 1.4117 0.1580   0.2058 0.1566 1.3137 0.1890   
5 Acc. Exam. Request -0.5799 0.2452 -2.3655 0.0180 * -0.6898 0.2977 -2.3167 0.0205 * 
7 ln(1+ # inventors) -0.1972 0.0909 -2.1704 0.0300 * -0.2750 0.1092 -2.5186 0.0118 * 
10a ln(1+5-year cites) -0.1309 0.0395 -3.3104 0.0009 ** - - - -  
10b Ln (incremental forward cites) - - - -  -0.3003 0.0762 -3.9412 0.0001 ** 
  
Scale Parameters           
 Stage 1 1.3297 0.0639 20.8201 0.0000 ** 1.1339 0.0530 21.3894 0.0000 ** 
 Stage 3 1.7818 0.2456 7.2563 0.0000 ** 1.4531 0.2010 7.2299 0.0000 ** 
  Log-Likelihood (0): -3699.327; Log-L (model): -3426.318 Log-Likelihood (0): -3699.327; Log-L (model): -3403.65 






Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
 
 
     I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X      
I:     ln(1+patent references)  1.0000 
II:    ln(1+non-patent references)  -0.1469 1.0000 
III:   ln(# designated states)  -0.0432 0.0745 1.0000 
IV:   Acc. Exam. Request   -0.0045 0.0421 0.0287 1.0000 
V:    Applicant (=1)   -0.0262 0.0628 0.0160 0.0188 1.0000 
VI:   ln(1+ # inventors)   -0.0070 0.0678 0.0030 0.0113 0.1441 1.0000 
VII:  PCT I    0.0616   0.1141   0.0203  -0.0136   0.0269   0.0105   1.0000 
VIII:  PCT I    0.0892   0.1563   0.0215   0.0062   0.0119  -0.0649  -0.0615   1.0000 
IX:   ln(1+5-year cites)   0 0.2463  -0.0000   0.0546  -0.0149   0.0074   0.1194  -0.1165  -0.2556   1.0000 
X:  Ln (incremental forward cites)  0.2167  -0.0411   0.0203  -0.0097  -0.0068  -0.0020  -0.0886  -0.1767   0.3730   1.0000 
 
 
Table A2       
Prediction of patent grant based on models Grant   

















Appendix B: A More Elaborate Description of Variance Decomposition Discrete Choice Models 
 
 
Using the basic axioms of Random Utility Theory (RUT), unobservable (latent) technological 
quality (=techno-economic quality), LQi, of patent ‘i’ can be expressed as an additive function of its 
systematic/explainable technological quality, Qi, and some random/unexplainable component, εi. That 
is, 
 
iii QLQ ε+=  (
1) 
Systematic technological quality (Qi) is assumed to be a generalized regression function of 
various observable and measurable factors. In turn, these factors ultimately determine the overall 
technological quality of a patent as judged by a patent office and hence its likelihood of being granted 
upon application or upheld upon challenge. We assume this function to be linear in the parameters 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). We define a matrix iΧ  which describes the measurable technological 
quality of patent ‘i’ on various attributes (see Table 1, exogenous variables). We define a set of 
parameters,β  which capture the effect that these factors have on changes in mean (systematic) 
technological quality. In general, the impact that each dimension of a patent application has on its 
mean technological quality is: 
 
siisQ βΧ=  (
2) 
We use the subscript 's' to suggest that the perceived quality of a patent at different stages of a 
patent process (initial application; patent opposition) may be different. In particular, while the 
(observable) patent characteristics may be constant, it is possible that the average correlation of these 
characteristics with its perceived quality may differ from stage to stage; hence, requiring a separate set 
of parameters, β, for each stage 's'. 
Among the basic empirical models capable of estimating different sets of parameters for 
similar outcomes using discrete choice data are so-called multinomial models. Essentially, by 
comparing sets of different parameters, β, for each stage 's' in our data structure allows us to assess the 
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consistency of the decision making across the different stages. This is why we use discrete choice 
models, however, there are various challenges in applying discrete choice modeling to our data. 
McFadden (1974) introduces several axioms to construct the (basic) multinomial logit model, 
including Independence-from-Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), positivity, and irrelevance of alternative 
set effect. This implies that the random elements, ε, are iid. By further assuming that this distribution is 
Gumbel (extreme value type I), the closed-form MNL can be constructed (Ben-Akiva & Lerman 
1985). In the multinomial logit model, one assumes that the error component, ε, is distributed iid 
Gumbel, with a zero location parameter (without loss of generality) and scale parameter, λ. Applying a 
multinomial logic to our data, from McFadden (1974), the probability that a patent application ‘i’ ends 














P   
(
3) 
In the first stage (s=1), Pit is the probability that patent 'i' will be granted. The technological 
quality required for a patent not to be granted must be set to some threshold value (e.g. zero) for 
identification purposes, consistent with a binary logistic regression expression. In the opposition 
(“challenge”) stage, we bundle the three outcomes (rejection of opposition/amendment of 
patent/revocation of patent) into two, and Pit is the probability that patent 'i' is maintained as granted 
(rejection of opposition) or not (patent amended or revoked) (note: by bundling the outcomes in this 
fashion, the thresholds for technological quality in Stage 1 and Stage 3 are set equal). The 
technological quality threshold of a patent being revoked or amended upon such challenge is set to 
zero, again resulting in a binary logistic expression. In turn, concerns about IIA violations are not 
applicable, contrary to what one might think at first sight when looking at the “nested” structure of our 
data.  
In this model, it is not well known that the estimates of vector β, of length 'k', describing the 
impact of various factors on mean systematic quality, are confounded with scale (Louviere, 2001). In 
any single data set, the scale parameter of the random component, λ, a scalar, is not identifiable, so the 
usual procedure is to arbitrarily set its value to 1. By ignoring this parameter, however, one could 
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make erroneous conclusions about the true assessments of technological quality by the patent office in 
the different stages (Stage 1: grant yes/now; Stage 3: patent revoked/amended/upheld as granted). 
Specifically, conclusions about differences between decisions based on estimates of β could be 
explained by differences in the true underlying assessment structure with respect to technological 
quality, differences in underlying variability or both (Louviere, 2001). 
When one estimates a single discrete choice model with a latent dependent variable (including 
probit, mixed logit), true estimates of β are confounded with the scale parameter. In turn, the estimates 
are (λβ), where λ is the scale parameter associated with that particular set of data. The scale is 






λ =   
(
4) 
In turn, when we compare parameter estimates related to systematic components of 
technological quality assessments, we actually compare a confounded set of parameters. For instance, 
estimates describing the impact of patent characteristics on the likelihood of a patent being granted 
(Stage 1) may be (λ1β1). Estimates describing the impact of patent characteristics on the likelihood of 
a patent being upheld upon opposition (Stage 3) may be denoted (λ3β3). Although we often arbitrarily 
set the value of λ1 and λ2 to unity (as most statistical packages do), we cannot be sure that in 
comparing estimates from two models, say (λ1β1) to (λ3β3), that differences are differences in true 
underlying technological quality assessments (i.e., heterogeneous β), differences in the variance of the 
random components (i.e., heterogeneous λ), or simultaneously differences in both sets of parameters 
(this problem was first addressed in the quantitative marketing literature by Ben-Akivaet.al. 1994, 
Hensher, Louviere, & Swait, 1999, and Louviere, Fox, & Moore, 1993). 34  
                                                          
34  In other areas, the issue related to comparing confounded estimates has been noted and used to identify 
that erroneous conclusions may have often been made in ignoring this statistical truth. For instance, in 
marketing science several authors have demonstrated empirically that often differences that appear to be 
occurring in terms of consumer preference observed in real markets relative to preferences obtained in 
hypothetical settings (e.g., choice experiment) can be dismissed once the differences in variability in 
consumers choices across the two settings are accounted for (Ben-Akiva et al. 1994; Hensher, Louviere, 
and Swait 1999; Louviere, Fox, and Moore 1993). For example, the way in which consumers trade-off 
price (e.g., prefer products with lower prices) and aspects of quality (e.g., prefer higher quality products) 
is often the same whether these evaluations are made in relation to real products (i.e., revealed 
preferences) or in relation to hypothetical products (i.e., stated preferences). In turn, once accounting for 
 XVIII 
 
Essentially, the underlying empirical possibilities that require testing are two fold. Firstly, we 
wish to ascertain whether technological quality assessments by a patent office are the same (i.e., β1 = 
β2) across granting and challenge stages. Second we wish to do this but account for whether the scale 
parameters (corresponding to variability) are also the same (i.e., λ1 = λ2). Essentially, we wish to test 
whether assessments of a patents technological merit relate to several observable characteristics of this 
patent and consider if these systematic assessments are homogeneous or heterogeneous across two 
data sets (or populations); we simultaneously test whether the randomness with which choices are 
observed are heterogeneous or homogeneous across two data sets. 
In order to address this issue, Swait & Louviere (1993) propose a nested hypothesis testing 
procedure.  
First, the authors estimate a model in which complete heterogeneity is imposed on both the 
scale and assessment components relating to technological quality. That is, essentially, a sample-
specific set of parameters is estimated for each stage (Stage 1: all patent applications; Stage 3: opposed 
patents only). In order to do this, however, the scale parameter cannot be identified and set arbitrarily 
to one in any one data set. The model log-likelihoods, however, provide a base measure for which 
subsequent models imposing various aspects of homogeneity can then be compared.  
Second, Swait and Louviere propose a model of complete technological quality assessment 
and variance homogeneity, in which the data from the two samples are pooled (Stage 1: all patent 
applications; Stage 3: opposed patents only). This model is tested against the base model of complete 
heterogeneity using a likelihood ratio test.  
Third, the authors introduce a model of complete quality assessment homogeneity while 
relaxing the assumption of variance homogeneity. To do this, they manually multiply the independent 
measurable components of one data set by a scale ratio and assume the alternative data set has a scale 
ratio of one. The concavity of the likelihood function with respect to the varying scale ratio allows a 
maximizing scale ratio to be identified under a hypothesis of assessment homogeneity regarding 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
differences in the variability inherent in these evaluations, it can often be concluded that trade-offs are 
identical rather than an initial hypothesis that preferences differ. 
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technological quality. Comparing this model's likelihood to the base model of complete homogeneity 
allows this hypothesis to be formally tested.  
Swait & Louviere’s (1993) model only assesses the variance differences (using a manual grid 
search), given that homogeneity in the systematic component has been established. If, however, the 
model that allows for variance heterogeneity is significantly different from the model of complete 
homogeneity one question remains. Namely, is this what drives the heterogeneity of the variance? We 
use our own purpose-written software which allows this to be estimated using a full-information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) approach in which a Newton-Raphson algorithm is used, given a closed 
form solution. In more detail, we propose to model and test the variation from an assumption of 
homogeneity by estimating two parameters for each of the potentially heterogeneous variables, such 
that one parameter (homogenous term) describes the average impact across assessment Stages 1 
(Grant) and 3 (opposition outcome) and another parameter describes the deviation from this average 
impact for one assessment stage relative to the other. We use τ to denote the sets of factors suspected 
of being considered by patent offices in a heterogeneous fashion across the two assessment stages. We 
let the impact of these factors be determined by: 
βτ = βτ* + βτsZs        (5) 
where Zs = -1 if initial stage and +1 if challenge stage. βτ* is the average impact of factor τ, 
and βτs provides a test of the degree to which such homogeneity across stages is being violated. That 
is, the impact of factor τ for the initial stage is given by: 
βτ initial = βτ* - βτs      (6) 
and the impact of factor τ for the challenge stage is given by: 
βτ challenge = βτ* + βτs     (7) 
In turn, the t-statistic associated with the mean estimate of βτs provides a formal test to assess whether 
an assumption of preference homogeneity is significantly violated (i.e., Ho: βτs = 0). Since each model 
is also nested within the previous models of homogeneity, appropriate likelihood ratio tests are 
applicable to further confirm the resulting model. 
 
 
